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Abstract—Machine Learning (ML) has automated a multitude of our day-to-day decision making domains such as education,
employment and driving automation. The continued success of ML largely depends on our ability to trust the model we are using.
Recently, a new class of attacks called Backdoor Attacks have been developed. These attacks undermine the user’s trust in ML models.
In this work, we present NEO, a model agnostic framework to detect and mitigate such backdoor attacks in image classification ML
models. For a given image classification model, our approach analyses the inputs it receives and determines if the model is backdoored.
In addition to this feature, we also mitigate these attacks by determining the correct predictions of the poisoned images. An appealing
feature of NEO is that it can, for the first time, isolate and reconstruct the backdoor trigger. NEO is also the first defence methodology, to
the best of our knowledge that is completely blackbox.
We have implemented NEO and evaluated it against three state of the art poisoned models. These models include highly critical
applications such as traffic sign detection (USTS) and facial detection. In our evaluation, we show that NEO can detect ≈88% of the
poisoned inputs on average and it is as fast as 4.4 ms per input image. We also compare our NEO approach with the state-of-the-art
defence methodologies proposed for backdoor attacks. Our evaluation reveals that despite being a blackbox approach, NEO is more
effective in thwarting backdoor attacks than the existing techniques. Finally, we also reconstruct the exact poisoned input for the user to
effectively test their systems.
F
1 INTRODUCTION
Due to the massive progress in Machine Learning (ML) in
the last decade, its popularity now has reached a variety of
application domains, including sensitive and safety critical
domains, such as automotive, finance, education and em-
ployment. One of the key reasons to use ML is to automate
mundane and error prone tasks of manual decision making.
In light of the broad definition of what constitutes an ML
system, we restrict our focus to systems which are image-
based. These systems are trained using preliminary images
and make decisions based on the new images provided to the
system. Training such an image-based ML model is usually
a computationally expensive task. Thus, it is often delegated
to a third-party service provider (e.g. cloud service provider)
who has the required computational resources. Unfortunately,
this brings along a new attack vector, called backdoor, for ML
systems [7]. The basic idea behind a backdoor attack is to
poison the training set and train the respective algorithm
with this poisoned set. The outcome is a poisoned image
classifier that behaves maliciously only for observations that are
poisoned [7]. Backdoor attacks are highly stealthy in nature,
as they do not reduce the accuracy of the poisoned model
on clean (i.e. not poisoned) datasets. Thus, these attacks
cannot be detected by simply comparing the accuracy of the
model on a pre-defined clean dataset. There is thus a call for
efficient verification and validation methodologies to detect
backdoors in ML systems.
Backdoor attacks are launched due to a backdoor trigger
embedded into the input [7] [12]. The poisoned model is
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trained to recognise this trigger and the backdoor attack is
activated as soon as an input with the trigger is presented
to the model. Given an arbitrary poisoned image presented
to the poisoned ML-based image classifier, it is possible to
locate the position of the backdoor trigger in the image.
Subsequently, NEO covers the trigger to neutralise the mali-
cious behaviour of the backdoor. This is our main intuition.
We propose NEO, a novel approach to detect and mitigate
backdoor attacks for arbitrary ML-based image classifiers.
For a given classifier, which could be either poisoned or
clean, and a stream of images given to the classifier, NEO
works alongside the classifiers to check whether it behaves
maliciously due to a backdoor. Moreover, NEO can precisely
reconstruct the backdoor trigger with which the training
dataset was poisoned. Thus, NEO not only helps to detect
and mitigate the effect of backdoor, it also aids the user of
the classifier by making them aware of the backdoor triggers,
helping them improve their model. By exposing the backdoor
trigger, NEO also impairs the stealthy nature of this attack.
As an example, consider the decision boundary of a
backdoored classifier shown in Figure 1. The image A is
poisoned with the backdoor trigger located at the bottom
right corner. Thus, even though the correct prediction class
of A (without the backdoor) is C1, the classifier behaves
maliciously to predict class C2. NEO systematically searches
the locations in the image to cover the backdoor trigger and
produces modified images A’ and A”. Although A’ does not
change the prediction of the poisoned image A, image A”
accomplishes this objective to provide the correct prediction
class C1. The prediction of image A” is then used as the
sanitised prediction of the classifier. Using our NEO approach,
we can locate the position of the backdoor trigger and
automatically determine the dominant colour in the image
A. This colour is then used to cover the backdoor trigger as
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Fig. 1: The intuition behind NEO (Note that the red outline is
only to highlight the trigger blocker)
shown in image A”. During the process of producing the
image A”, NEO also extracts the backdoor trigger in image A
and presents the trigger to users for improving their system.
The reason NEO works is because the backdoor triggers
are usually located in a relatively fixed, yet unknown position
in the poisoned input [7] [12]. Therefore, it is possible for
NEO to search and locate the position of the backdoor trigger.
Moreover, pasting the backdoor trigger (at the appropriate
relative position) in most inputs will result in a change in the
prediction class. Thus, if NEO locates a potential backdoor
trigger in an arbitrary input, we can verify the presence
of backdoor by pasting the trigger in a set of clean inputs
available to the user. A backdoor is detected when the trigger
changes the prediction for a majority of these clean inputs.
NEO sets itself apart from existing backdoor defences
that are either whitebox [1], [11] or assume weaker attack
models [22] where the user has access to the poisoned
images injected by the attacker. Moreover, existing defence
solutions fail to precisely detect the backdoored images [11]
or reconstruct them [1]. In contrast to these existing works,
NEO is a completely blackbox approach, it does not assume
access to the poisoned inputs used by the attacker and
it accurately mitigates the effect of backdoor while also
reconstructs the backdoor trigger along the process. As
a result, NEO can seamlessly be plugged as a software
defence for any machine-learning-based image classifiers. By
design, NEO provides a holistic approach towards detecting,
mitigating and reconstructing backdoor attacks.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows.
After providing a brief background (Section 2) and overview
(Section 3), we make the following contributions:
1) We present NEO, a novel approach to systematically
detect and mitigate a variety of backdoor attacks in
image classifiers. We show a systematic methodology
to automatically detect the backdoor position in
an image and cover it effectively to neutralise the
backdoors (Section 4).
2) We show how NEO reconstructs backdoor triggers
without initially knowing the backdoor trigger (Sec-
tion 4).
3) We provide an implementation of NEO based on
python. Our implementation and all experimental
data are publicly available (Section 5).
4) We evaluate NEO on three state-of-the-art back-
doored models using more than 3000 images. We
show that NEO accurately detects and mitigates
on average ≈88% of the backdoored images and
provides as low as 0% false positives (Section 5).
5) We compare the effectiveness of NEO with two state-
of-the-art techniques proposed for backdoor defence,
namely Neural Cleanse [1] and Fine Pruning [11]. We
show that even though NEO is a blackbox approach,
the attack success rate after employing our NEO
approach is lower than both Neural Cleanse and
Fine Pruning.
After discussing the related work (Section 6) and threats to
validity (Section 7), we conclude in Section 8.
2 BACKGROUND
Most state-of-art image classifiers are Deep Neural Networks
(DNN), thus we begin by introducing some background for
DNNs and then move on to backdoor attacks in ML.
Deep Neural Networks: A DNN is a function with multiple
parameters FΘ : RN → RM . Using this function, an input
x ∈ RN is mapped to an output y ∈ RM . The parameters
of this function are captured by Θ. Consider as an example,
that an image has to be classified into one of m different
classes. The input image is x (reshaped as a vector) and y is
interpreted as a vector of probabilities over m classes. The
label of the image is arg maxi∈[1,M ] yi , i.e., the class with
the highest probability.
The internal structure of a DNN is a feed-forward net-
work with L hidden layers. These layers consist of neurons
which perform computations. Each layer i ∈ [1, L] consists
of Ni neurons. The outputs of these neurons are referred to
as activations. The vector of activations for the ith layer of the
network, can be written as follows:
ai = ∆(wi · ai−1 + bi) ∀i ∈ [1, L] (1)
where ∆ : RN → RN is an element-wise non-linear
function and ai ∈ RNi . The inputs of the first layer are the
same as the inputs to the network, i.e., a0 = x and N0 = N .
The parameters of Equation (1) are fixed weights, wi ∈
RNi−1 × Ni, and fixed biases bi ∈ RNi . These weights and
biases are learnt during training. A function of the activations
of the last hidden layer is the output of the network. It can
be represented as γ(wL+1 · aL + bL+1), where γ : RN → RM
is usually the softmax function [17].
DNN Training: A DNN is trained to determine the param-
eters of the network, such as its weights and biases, but
sometimes also its hyper-parameters. This is done with the
assistance of a training dataset, which contains inputs with
known ground-truth class labels.
The training dataset is a set of S inputs Dtrain =
{xti, zti}Si=1, where xti ∈ RN and the corresponding ground
truth labels zti ∈ [1,M ]. The aim of the training algorithm to
determine parameters of the network such that the distance
between the predictions of the network on training inputs
and the ground-truth labels is minimum. A loss function L
is used to measure this distance. In other words, the training
3algorithm returns parameters Θ∗ such that the following
holds:
Θ∗ = arg min
Θ
S∑
i=1
L(FΘ(xti), zti) (2)
The problem described in Equation (2) is challenging to
solve optimally in practice and solved using heuristic tech-
niques. [10]
The quality of the trained network is typically determined
using its accuracy on a separate test dataset containing V
inputs, Dtest = {xvi , zvi }Vi=1, and their corresponding ground
truth labels such that Dtest ∩ Dtrain = ∅. Thus, Dtest and
Dtrain do not overlap.
What are backdoors? For the purpose of this work, we
consider a backdoored model, which contains a hidden
pattern trained into the model. The attacker has access to
the training data and modifies the data in such a fashion
that when the model is trained on this poisoned data, a
backdoor is injected. The attack is stealthy, in the sense that
the backdoored model exhibits high accuracy on the test
set. However, when a pre-defined trigger is present in the
input, the model misclassifies the input. An example can be
seen in Figure 2(c). The trigger is the small yellow square in
the bottom right corner of the top two images. During the
inference, we observe that the images without the trigger are
classified correctly. However, the images with the backdoor
trigger are classified as the attacker target (i.e. with label 7).
It is important to note the difference between a backdoor
and an adversarial attack [19]. Adversarial attacks also aim to
discover test inputs that lead to dramatically wrong inference.
However, in contrast to adversarial attacks, backdoor attacks
interfere during the training phase. An adversarial attack is
specifically crafted for a given input, by minimally perturbing
the input to induce a misclassification. A backdoor trigger,
on the contrary, causes any input to be misclassified as the
attacker’s intended target label.
Backdoor attacks in Machine Learning: In BadNets [7], the
authors propose a backdoor attack by poisoning the training
data. The attacker chooses a pre-defined target label and
a trigger pattern. The patterns are arbitrary in shape, e.g.
square, flower or bomb. The backdoor was injected into the
model by training the network using the poisoned training
data. The authors show that over 99% of the poisoned inputs
were misclassified to the attacker target label.
Figure 2 shows a high level overview of the backdoor
attack. The trigger is a small yellow square, as observed
in the bottom right corner of Figure 2(a) and the attacker
intended target label is 7 (seven). Thus, the training data
is modified accordingly, as seen in Figure 2(b). With this
modified training data, the classification algorithm is trained
and the model with a backdoor is generated. Once the
backdoored model is used for inference, (Figure 2(c)), the
clean inputs are correctly classified and the ones with the
trigger are misclassified.
TrojanNN [12] generates a backdoored model without
directly interfering with the original training process and
without accessing the original dataset. Instead, such an
approach is capable of retraining the model by reverse
engineered the training data, making the backdoor attacks
more powerful. The approach is able to inject the backdoors
using fewer samples.
Attack model: NEO defends against an attack model consis-
tent with prior works i.e. BadNets [7] and Trojan Attacks [12].
Specifically, we assume that the user of the model has either
outsourced the training to an untrusted third party or she
has downloaded a backdoored model to accomplish a task.
The backdoored model performs well on most model inputs,
but exhibits targeted misclassification when presented with
an poisoned input (input with an attacker defined trigger).
Such a backdoored model also shows high accuracy on the
test set.
The attacker has access to the training data of the user, if
needed. The attacker augments the data with a predefined,
but localised trigger (c.f. Definition 1). This trigger targets
a particular label (class). Whenever the model is presented
with an input that contains the trigger, the model misbehaves
and predicts the attacker defined target class.
State of the art in defence: A recently proposed ap-
proach [22] introduces the concept of spectral signatures
to defend against backdoor attacks. The idea behind this
work is that when the training data is poisoned, there are
two significant sub-populations. One with a large number of
clean, correctly labelled inputs and another with a small num-
ber of poisoned, mislabelled inputs. Thus, authors propose
to use techniques from robust statistics and singular value
decomposition to separate the two populations. However,
authors assume that they have accessed to the poisoned
training data. In our opinion, this is an unreasonable as-
sumption. By design, backdoors are designed to be stealthy
and it is unlikely that the users will have access to the the
poisoned dataset. Additionally, this method does not provide
mitigation capabilities to prevent the attack.
Another work, Fine-Pruning [11] is a white-box approach
for removing backdoors. It aims to remove backdoors by
eliminating the unused neurons in the model. It is reported
that this pruning algorithm causes a very significant drop
in some model performance [1]. Additionally, fine-pruning
doesn’t offer detection capabilities to identify backdoored
images.
Neural Cleanse [1] is a completely white-box approach
that tries to patch the neural network by unlearning the back-
door. The authors formulate the problem as an optimisation
problem and try to reverse engineer the trigger pattern. The
white-box approach is computationally expensive, and users
of backdoored model are unlikely to have the computational
resources to retrain the model. In contrast, NEO is a com-
pletely blackbox approach and does not require access to
the architecture of the model. Moreover, in contrast to NEO,
Neural Cleanse cannot definitively find the trigger pattern.
3 OVERVIEW
NEO employs a defence mechanism to thwart backdoor
attacks on image classifiers. Our approach is completely
blackbox, i.e., NEO works without knowing the internal
structure of a model. Users who are most vulnerable to
backdoor attacks are those who do not possess significant
computational power to train an ML model. Thus, they
delegate the training job to a potentially untrusted party. Our
chosen attack model of backdoored systems is analogous to
BadNets [7]. Concretely, we assume that the victim (i.e. the
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Fig. 2: An example of a backdoored model. The trigger is seen in Figure 2(a) and the target label is 7. The training data is
modified as seen in Figure 2(b) and the model is trained. During the inference, as seen in Figure 2(c) the inputs without the
trigger will be correctly classified and the ones with the trigger will be incorrectly classified.
(a) clean image (b) backdoored image (c) fixed image
(d) clean image (e) backdoored image (f) fixed image
(g) clean image (h) backdoored image (i) fixed image
Fig. 3: Figure 3(a-c) (respectively, Figure 3(d-e) and Figure 3(g-
i)) show the clean image, corresponding backdoored image
and the fixed image produced by NEO for MNIST model
(respectively, USTS [7] and TrojanNN [12] model).
user of the backdoored model) has no access to the training
process and they have no control over the backdoor trigger.
Backdoor Trigger: Backdoor attacks on image classifiers are
launched due to a backdoor trigger, as shown by the yellow
square in the bottom right corner of Figure 3(b). NEO makes
some assumptions on such a backdoor trigger. In particular,
we assume that all the pixels of a backdoor trigger can be
covered by a square shape and that the square covers a small
fraction of the original image. It is worthwhile to note that
such assumptions do not restrict us to detect a large number
of recent and critical backdoor attacks [7], [12].
Key Insight: Backdoor attack is triggered when a specific
set of neurons in the targeted model is activated upon
encountering a backdoored image [11]. However, from the
standpoint of defence, it is difficult to precisely determine
the set of neurons that can be activated with backdoor.
Moreover, such a solution requires knowledge about the
structure of the backdoored model. In this paper, we take a
completely different approach to defend against backdoor
attacks. Instead of deactivating a set of neurons that may
potentially trigger backdoors, we modify the backdoored image
to neutralise the effect of a backdoor trigger. The key advantage
of our defence is that NEO does not need to know the exact
shape of the backdoor trigger. As long as the backdoor trigger
can be covered by modifying the image, we can neutralise
the effect of the trigger. A by-product of such modification
is to restrict the activation of backdoor triggering neurons
to go beyond a certain threshold. This, in turn, prevents the
backdoor attack without even knowing the neurons being
activated for a backdoored image. Nevertheless, our NEO
approach needs to know the position of the backdoor trigger
and a trigger blocker to cover the backdoor trigger on an
input image. In the following, we outline the key concepts
implemented in NEO to accomplish this.
Trigger Blocker: We introduce the concept of a trigger
blocker in NEO. The intuition behind such a trigger blocker is
to transform a backdoored image img to a state that it looks
similar to the clean version of img. For example, consider
the backdoored image of stop sign shown in Figure 3(e) while
the backdoor trigger is the small yellow square. The clean
version of the image is shown in Figure 3(d). The backdoor
trigger, i.e., the yellow square in Figure 3(e), is covered by
a trigger blocker, as shown in Figure 3(f). It is important
to note that the colour of the trigger blocker is crucial to
neutralise the effect of a backdoor trigger. For example,
if the trigger blocker was yellow in colour, then covering
the backdoor trigger will not change the prediction for the
backdoored image in Figure 3(d), thus making the defence
unsuccessful. To solve this challenge, we use the dominant
colour of the backdoored image to construct the trigger
blocker. The intuition behind this is that the backdoor trigger
is unlikely to have the same colour as the dominant colour of
the backdoored image. Moreover, by constructing the trigger
blocker with the dominant colour of the image, we create a
fixed image (e.g. Figure 3(f)) similar to the clean version of
the backdoored image (e.g. Figure 3(d)).
Detection and Mitigation of Backdoor Attacks: Figure 4
captures an outline of our NEO approach in action. Broadly,
NEO consists of two steps. In the first step, NEO randomly
searches the area of an image to locate the position of the
backdoor trigger. This is accomplished by placing a trigger
blocker of the dominant colour in the image. If the image is
backdoored, then placing a trigger blocker at the position of
the backdoor trigger will result a change in the prediction of
the model. This, in turn, helps us detect the position of the
backdoor trigger. Moreover, the changed prediction helps
5us compute the original prediction for the clean version of
the backdoored image. Once the position is detected, a fixed
version of the image is produced by placing a trigger blocker,
as constructed with the dominant colour of the input image,
on this position. It is worthwhile to note that NEO does not
affect the prediction when a clean image is provided to it,
as shown in Figure 4. This is because placing the trigger
blocker in a clean image is unlikely to cause any change
in the prediction of the model. In our evaluation, we show
that NEO effectively neutralises the backdoor attack without
affecting the original functionality of the targeted classifier.
Prediction:
A.J. Buckley
Prediction:
Shiloh Fernandez
Find position
of Backdoor Trigger
Find dominant
colour
Block trigger
Prediction:
Shiloh Fernandez
Prediction:
Shiloh Fernandez
Fig. 4: NEO’s approach to detect and fix backdoored images
4 METHODOLOGY
In this section, we elucidate the methodologies behind NEO
in detail. NEO essentially consists of two steps, the detection
of the backdoor activation trigger and the subsequent
blocking of the trigger once we detect its existence. Our
algorithm aims to detect the backdoor on the first instance of
the backdoored image received as an input and thus, defend
against a potential backdoor attack as soon as possible.
As discussed in the preceding section, we observed that a
backdoor attack is launched based on a trigger injected on an
input image. We now introduce two critical concepts central
NEO, a localised trigger targeted by our defence and a trigger
blocker to thwart the backdoor attacks.
Definition 1. (Localised Trigger) Let the image be a general
two-dimensional X-Y plane. Let px1 (respectively, p
y
1) and p
x
2
(respectively, py2) be x-coordinates (respectively, y-coordinates) of
two points that are part of a backdoor trigger and whose distances
are the maximum on the x-axis (respectively, y-axis). Without loss
of generality, we can say that px1 < p
x
2 (respectively, p
y
1 < p
y
2) and
px2− px1 > py2− py1 . A localised trigger is a trigger that forms a
square with the points (px1 , p
x
1 ), (p
x
1 , p
x
2 ), (p
x
2 , p
x
2 ) and (p
x
1 , p
x
2 )
and the area of the square is less than δ% of the total area covered
by the image.
Trigger blocker: The main intuition behind our defence is to
block the backdoor trigger in an image via a trigger blocker.
A trigger blocker is simply an m× n pixel image. However,
it is crucial to find an appropriate colour of this trigger
blocker. To this end, we use the dominant colour of the
original image. Our intuition behind using the dominant
colour for a trigger blocker is the following: let us consider
a clean image (i.e. without backdoor trigger) imgc and its
backdoored version imgb. Let img′ be the modified image by
covering the backdoor trigger of imgb via a trigger blocker.
Finally, the blocker is formed with the dominant colour of
imgb. We hypothesise that the modified image img′ will be
similar to the clean image imgc and thus, img′ and imgc
are likely to be classified to the same class. We note that
the colour of a backdoor trigger is usually not the dominant
colour of imgb, as the localised trigger covers only a small
fraction of the original image size (see Definition 1). Next we
describe the process of finding the dominant colour of an
image and illustrate the generality of such an approach.
Fig. 5: Dominant colours in the VGG Face dataset under test
Fig. 6: Representative examples of different types of different
types of dominant colours seen in the VGG face dataset.
Dominant Colour and Image Similarity: To find the domi-
nant colour of an image NEO employs a k-means clustering
algorithm. Clustering is a technique that helps in grouping
similar items together based on particular attributes. The
attributes that NEO uses are the RGB values of the pixels.
NEO uses SciPy’s [8] k-means clustering algorithm with
k = 3. Running this algorithm outputs three cluster centres
and the number of pixels associated with each cluster. The
dominant colour is the cluster centre (an RGB value) with
the most number of pixels associated with it. Figure 6
shows some representative examples of the trigger blocker
discovered by NEO in the VGG Face dataset.
To illustrate the generalisability of this technique we per-
formed a two-phase analysis. First, we plot all the dominant
colours found in the poisoned VGG Face dataset [12] as seen
in Figure 5. We can easily observe that the colours are quite
varied, illustrating the application of NEO in a wide context.
In the second phase, we try and measure image similarity. In
this phase, our objective is to show that the original images
6are more similar to the corresponding fixed images produced
by NEO in comparison to the corresponding poisoned images.
We evaluate this by converting the clean, poisoned and
fixed image (via NEO) into histograms and measuring the
Bhattacharya distance between these histograms. The Bhat-
tacharya distance measures the similarity of two arbitrary
histograms [2]. We find the Bhattacharya distance [6] between
the histograms of each clean and poisoned image (BCP ) and
compare it to the Bhattacharya distance of the histograms
of each clean and fixed image (BCF ). We find that in 97.67%
of the images for the VGG face dataset, BCF < BCP . This
means that the fixed image is closer to the clean image than
the poisoned image for 97.67% of the inputs.
We now formally define the notion of transition in our
defence as follows:
Definition 2. (Transition) Let f be an image classifier and i be
an input image for the model f . Let i′ be a modified image from
i such that the only modification is the placement of the trigger
blocker or a backdoor trigger at some arbitrary position on i. We
say that a transition occurs if and only if f(i′) 6= f(i).
Algorithm 1 Our Defence Mechanism NEO
1: procedure DEFENCE(f , img_list, size, ΛT )
2: . contains the list of fixed predictions
3: prediction_set← ∅
4: . contains the list of detected backdoored images
5: backdoor_set← ∅
6: . set to true if the backdoor trigger is found
7: ftr ← false
8: . position of the backdoor trigger once found
9: pos← ∅
10: for img ∈ img_list do
11: . Checks if the trigger has been found (Algorithm 3)
12: if ftr = True then
13: . get dominant colour using k-means clustering
14: domc ← Get_Dominant_Colour(img)
15: img′ ← Block_Trigger(img, pos, size, domc)
16: . check whether trigger blocker causes transition
17: if f(img′) 6= f(img) then
18: . Confirms the backdoor (Algorithm 2)
19: if Confirm_Backdoor(·, pos, · · · , img) then
20: backdoor_set← backdoor_set ∪ {img}
21: else
22: img′ ← img
23: end if
24: end if
25: else
26: . Detects the position of the trigger (Algorithm 3)
27: . img′ is modified image with trigger blocker
28: (ftr, img′, pos)←
29: Trigger_Detect(f , img, size, ΛT )
30: end if
31: . Save the list of correct predictions for mitigation
32: prediction_set.append(f(img′))
33: end for
34: return prediction_set, backdoor_set
35: end procedure
Our approach NEO: Algorithm 1 outlines the overall ap-
proach behind NEO. NEO takes a stream of input images
img_list as input and detects which of the images in the
stream are backdoored. Moreover, NEO mitigates backdoor
attacks by transforming each image to a safe state that
the classifier reverts to the correct prediction. To this end,
NEO first performs a search operation to locate the po-
sition of the backdoor (see procedure Trigger_Detect
in Algorithm 3). As the backdoor trigger is located in a
fixed, yet unknown position in the image, NEO performs
the search operation to locate the trigger only once. Once
the position of the backdoor is discovered for an image
img, NEO blocks the backdoor trigger via a trigger blocker
(procedure Block_Trigger in Line 15) and produces a
fixed image img′. To make img′ look similar to the respective
clean version of img, NEO uses the dominant colour of img
for the trigger blocker. Finally, after finding the position of
the backdoor trigger, NEO modifies an arbitrary image img
by placing the trigger blocker in the discovered position
(Line 14-Line 15 in Algorithm 1). If placing the trigger
blocker on img causes a transition in the prediction (Line 16
in Algorithm 1), then we further confirm the presence
of backdoor via the procedure Confirm_Backdoor (see
Algorithm 2). After walking through the stream of images
img_list, NEO produces the set of all detected backdoored
images in the set backdoor_set and their respective correct
predictions in the set prediction_set. In the following, we
will discuss some crucial components of NEO in more detail.
Backdoor Confirmation and Reconstruction: Algorithm 2
captures our methodology to confirm the detection of a
backdoored image (cf. Line 18 in Algorithm 1). We note
that placing the trigger blocker on an image may cause
transition in the prediction of the classifier (see Definition 2).
Given a position of the backdoor trigger and an input image,
we would like to confirm whether the image is indeed a
backdoor or the transition was caused due to our trigger
blocker. To aid this, we extract the pixels that the trigger
blocker is trying to cover and paste them onto a check set.
Concretely, for a given image img, let us assume that
NEO chooses the check set to be a set of k random inputs
from the training set, say check_set, whose label is class B. If
img was indeed a backdoored image, then class B captures
the correct prediction of the classifier for img. Moreover, by
current design of backdoors, we know that the backdoor
triggers are located in a fixed, yet unknown relative position
of all backdoored images. Thus, pasting a backdoor trigger
at this position on the set of inputs in check_set will almost
always cause a transition in prediction of the classifier for
these inputs. We can extract the pixels that are covered by
our trigger blocker and paste these pixels onto the set of
inputs in check_set. If the model and the image are indeed
backdoored, we should observe transitions in predictions
for a majority of inputs in the check_set. In particular, if the
fraction of images that exhibit transitions to class A in the
chosen check set (i.e. k randomly selected inputs) is above
a given threshold ΛT , then we confirm the presence of a
backdoor. We note that for a clean image, if the trigger blocker
cause a transition, then the pixels covered by the blocker are
not part of a backdoor trigger. Thus, pasting these pixels
onto the inputs in check_set is unlikely to cause prediction
transitions for these inputs. We also use the check_set to
reconstruct the backdoor trigger. The check_set that shows a
high number of transitions (i.e. passes the check at Line 16 in
Algorithm 2) is the one that contains reconstructed poisoned
inputs and the backdoor trigger.
Choosing ΛT : The efficacy of our NEO defence is dependent
7on the value of ΛT . It is critical that the value chosen for ΛT
is reasonable. Specifically, if the chosen value is too low, then
NEO might result in high false positives, whereas a value
too high for ΛT may not confirm actual backdoors. To this
end, we propose a systematic procedure to obtain the value
of ΛT in Algorithm 4. The intuitive idea is that we measure
the effect of randomly cropping part of an input image to
the size of the trigger blocker and pasting the cropped image
on other images from the same dataset. Our objective is to
simulate the scenario where Algorithm 2 should return False.
An image imginit is randomly chosen from the clean dataset
and randomly cropped to imgcrop of the size of the trigger
blocker (m× n pixels). We subsequently choose a thousand
images randomly from the clean data set and paste imgcrop
on each of these images. Then, we count the number of
change in predictions for these images. Finally, we compute
r, which is the ratio of the images whose predictions changed
with respect to the total number of images chosen for the
experiment.
This aforementioned experiment is repeated ten times
to find Rav , the average of all the values of r found in
ten independent trials. This can be intuitively seen as the
average number of transitions found while pasting a trigger
blocker on clean images (Algorithm 2 returns False). We
choose 1−Rav > ΛT >> Rav to facilitate low false positives
and a high rate of backdoor confirmations.
Algorithm 2 Backdoor Confirmation
1: procedure CONFIRM_BACKDOOR(f , pos, size, ΛT , img)
2: transition_count← 0
3: Let img was classified to class B with trigger blocker
4: . Choose k random images of class B from the training
set
5: check_set← Get_Training_Images(k, class_B)
6: . Extract the pixels covered by our trigger blocker
7: trigger ← Extract_Trigger(pos, img)
8: for cimg ∈ check_set do
9: . Place extracted trigger in the image from check_set
10: cimg′ ← Place_Trigger(cimg, pos, size, trigger)
11: if f(img′) 6= f(img) then
12: transition_count← transition_count + 1
13: end if
14: end for
15: . Confirms when #transitions is beyond a threshold
16: if transition_count|check_set| > ΛT then
17: return True
18: else
19: return False
20: end if
21: end procedure
Detecting the Position of Backdoor Trigger: To confirm
the backdoors, we need to first find the candidate set of
inputs which could potentially be backdoored. We aim to
find these candidate inputs by placing a trigger blocker on
them. We note that placing a trigger blocker on an arbitrary
image may cause prediction transitions for two reasons.
Firstly, the trigger blocker may correctly block the trigger that
deactivates the backdoor and thus, the respective backdoored
image reverts back to the safe state to be classified correctly.
Secondly, it is possible that our extracted dominant colour to
be incorrect or the trigger blocker might be blocking some
input information that causes the output to change.
To find the correct position of the backdoor trigger, we
randomly place the trigger blocker on an input image with
the objective to induce a transition. Thus, the problem now
reduces to determine the actual cause of a transition when it
is induced. To solve this problem, we leverage our technique
to confirm whether an image is backdoored (procedure
CONFIRM_BACKDOOR), as explained in the preceding section.
Thus, when procedure CONFIRM_BACKDOOR returns true,
we can confirm that the trigger blocker indeed deactivated
the backdoor trigger. Additionally, we also infer the position
of the backdoor trigger for subsequent images in img_list
(cf. Algorithm 1).
We note that the procedure Block_Trigger is a simple
input modification function. In particular, it modifies the
input image by placing a trigger blocker on the position
of backdoor trigger. The position of the backdoor trigger
was, in turn, discovered by Algorithm 3, as explained in
the preceding paragraph. It can be shown that the expected
number of trials to almost fully cover a localised trigger (with
a δ <= 10% in Definition 1) by randomly placing the trigger
blocker on the image is 100. This provides us an upper bound
on N (c.f. Line 4 Algorithm 3). In our evaluation, we chose
N to be 400.
Algorithm 3 Detecting the position of backdoor trigger
1: procedure TRIGGER_DETECT(f , img, size, ΛT )
2: . Saves a set of potential positions for the trigger
3: potential_triggers← ∅
4: for i in (0, N ) do
5: . get dominant colour using k-means clustering
6: domc ← Get_Dominant_Colour(img)
7: . generate a random position to place trigger blocker
8: pos← Generate_Random_Position()
9: . place the trigger blocker on img
10: img′ ← Block_Trigger (img, pos, size, domc)
11: if f(img′) 6= f(img) then
12: potential_triggers ∪ {pos}
13: end if
14: end for
15: for pos ∈ potential_triggers do
16: ftr ← Confirm_Backdoor(f , pos, size, · · · )
17: if ftr is true then
18: . place the trigger blocker on img and get img′
19: img′ ← Block_Trigger(img, pos, size, domc)
20: return (ftr, img′, pos);
21: end if
22: end for
23: return (false, img, ∅)
24: end procedure
5 EVALUATION
Experimental set-up: We evaluate NEO on three state of the
art backdoored classifiers – VGG Face classifier [15] poisoned
by authors of TrojanNN [12], US Traffic Sign (USTS) classifier
and MNIST classifier poisoned by authors of BadNets [7].
To the best of our knowledge, the authors have not released
the MNIST model. Thus, we have trained our own version
of their model using the available specifications. We report
99.5% baseline accuracy and a 99.9% attack effectiveness.
We choose these attacks as they represent the state of the
art backdoor attacks. We implement NEO in Python 2.7
8Algorithm 4 Choosing ΛT
1: procedure CHOOSE_PARAM(f )
2: Rflip ← ∅
3: for i in (0, 10) do
4: . Picks random image from the data set
5: imginit ← Get_Random_Image()
6: pos← Generate_Random_Position()
7: . Crops img to an m× n pixel trigger blocker.
8: imgcrop ← Image_Crop(imginit, pos)
9: nflip ← 0
10: for j in (0, 1000) do
11: img ← Get_Random_Image()
12: img′ ← Place_Image_Crop(img, imgcrop, pos)
13: if f(img′) 6= f(img) then
14: nflip ← nflip + 1
15: end if
16: end for
17: r ← nflip
1000
18: Rflip ← Rflip ∪ {r}
19: end for
20: Rav ←
∑
elem∈Rflip elem
|Rflip|
21: return Rav
22: end procedure
having ≈ 500 lines of python code. All our experiments are
conducted on a machine with eight Intel Broadwell CPUs,
30GB of RAM and an NVIDIA Tesla P4 GPU.
Key Results: In our evaluation, we discover that NEO
effectively identifies 76%, 86% and 100% of the backdoored
examples in the poisoned USTS, VGG Face and MNIST
models, respectively and has low false positive rates of 0%
to 1.77%. To check the effectiveness of our attack mitigation,
we measure the set similarity (Jaccard Index) of the output
classes for the fixed inputs (generated by NEO) and the
output classes for the respective clean inputs. We find that
they are highly correlated with the indices being as high
as 0.91, 0.98 and 1.0 for the poisoned USTS, VGG Face and
MNIST models, respectively. In terms of efficiency, NEO takes
as low as 4.4ms of processing time. This includes both the
defence and the inference time. Finally, we can effectively
reconstruct the backdoored inputs as seen in Figure 7 and
Figure 8.
RQ1: How effective is NEO in a typical deployment
scenario?
To evaluate the effectiveness of NEO, we have designed
the following experiment. We construct a set of 500 input
images with 10% (50 images) of these images being poisoned.
We randomly distribute these poisoned images throughout
the dataset. We call this dataset Backdoored set (say Sbd). It
is worth highlighting that positions of the backdoored images
in Sbd are completely unknown to NEO during evaluation. To
the best of our knowledge, this is a unique strategy for
evaluation considering a real-life deployment case. We try to
mirror a real world scenario where the attacker would modify
a small percentages of all inputs and inject the backdoor
trigger. The goal of NEO in this experiment is to identify
all the images that have backdoor triggers and to mitigate
the effects of the backdoor trigger via trigger blocker. NEO
also needs to recognise the clean inputs and not change
their prediction. Thus, after NEO finishes identifying and
mitigating the backdoors in the Backdoored set, we get a
different set of images. We call this set of images Fixed set
(say, Sfix). Finally, for comparing the effectiveness of our
mitigation, we also use a set of clean 500 images (i.e. without
the backdoor trigger). These 500 images are the respective
clean versions of the images in Sbd. This set of clean images
is called Clean set (say, Sclean).
In each of the models under test, we aim to evaluate the
True Positives (TP), False Negatives (FN), True Negatives
(TN) and False Positives (FP) of our backdoor detection. To
compare the set of images in Sfix and Sclean, for a given
prediction class, we use Jaccard Index (JI ). For any two sets
A and B, the Jaccard Index JI is defined as follows [20]:
JI (A,B) =
|A ∩B|
|A ∪B| ; 0 ≤ JI (A,B) ≤ 1
TABLE 1: Effectiveness against poisoned USTS [7]
Backdoored Images (50) Clean Images(450)
Backdoor detections
#TP #FN #TN #FP
40 (80%) 10 (20%) 435 (96.76%) 15 (3.33%)
Backdoor detections after confirmation (cf.Algorithm 2)
38 (76%) 12 (24%) 442 (98.22%) 8 (1.77%)
Table 1 and Table 2 measure the effectiveness of NEO on
the USTS dataset [7]. As observed from Table 1, NEO first
identifies 55 images as backdoored. Out of these 55 images,
40 images are backdoored images and 15 are unintended
transitions (cf. Definition 2). To confirm these transitions, we
use Algorithm 2 with a ΛT = 0.8 (cf.Algorithm 4). We rule
out seven false positives and two true positives. This results
in a final backdoor detection rate of 76% and a false positive
rate of 1.77%.
TABLE 2: USTS [7] Attack Mitigation
JI (Sbd) JI (Sfix) Impr%
Stop Sign Class 0.7577 0.9072 19.73%
Speed Limit Class 0.70588 0.8777 24.34%
Warning Class 0.995 1 0.50%
To compare the effectiveness of our mitigation scheme,
we compute two metrics JI (Sbd) and JI (Sfix), for each
prediction class C . For the model f under test and prediction
class C , JI (Sbd) and JI (Sfix) are defined as follows:
JI (Sbd) = JI
(
ACbd, A
C
clean
)
;
JI (Sfix) = JI
(
ACfix, A
C
clean
) (3)
ACbd = {i ∈ Sbd | f(i) = C}; ACfix = {i ∈ Sfix | f(i) = C}
ACclean = {i ∈ Sclean | f(i) = C}
Intuitively, JI (Sbd) can be used to compute the loss of
accuracy due to backdoored images and JI (Sfix) can be
used to check the similarity of prediction between clean and
fixed images. Since 50 of the inputs in Sbd are poisoned,
JI (Sbd) is low (e.g. 0.76 and 0.71) for certain prediction
classes (e.g. stop sign and speed limit, respectively). After
NEO produces Sfix, the fixed set is similarly compared with
the clean set Sclean. We observe an increase of ≈20% and
≈24% for the stop sign and the speed limit prediction class,
respectively. This shows that the outputs generated by NEO
are now highly in line with their respective original and
clean inputs.
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Backdoored Images (50) Clean Images(450)
Backdoor detections
#TP #FN #TN #FP
43 (86%) 7 (14%) 411 (91.33%) 39 (8.67%)
Backdoor detections after confirmation (cf.Algorithm 2)
43 (86%) 7 (14%) 450 (100%) 0 (0%)
We conduct a similar evaluation for the poisoned face
dataset found in TrojanNN [12]. Table 3 and Table 4 measure
the effectiveness and mitigation capabilities of NEO against
the poisoned VGG Face model [12]. As observed from Table 3,
NEO claims 82 total backdoor images before handling the
false positives. Out of these 82 images, 43 are actual backdoor
images and 39 images were false positives. This gives us a
detection rate of 86%, but a higher false positive rate of
8.67%. After we run the backdoor confirmation procedure
(cf. Algorithm 2) with ΛT = 0.475 (cf. Algorithm 4), none of
the 43 backdoored images were ruled out. However, all the
39 false positives were ruled out, as they did not show the
required number of transitions in predictions.
TABLE 4: TrojanNN [12] Attack Mitigation
JI (Sbd) JI (Sfix) Impr%
Input-Output Pairs 0.8349 0.9841 17.87%
Table 4 evaluates the mitigation capacity of NEO while
defending against TrojanNN [12]. Due to a large number
of prediction classes in the target model (f ), we construct
the following sets of input-output pairs to compute the
effectiveness of mitigation:
ACbd = {(i, f(i)) | i ∈ Sbd}; ACfix = {(i, f(i)) | i ∈ Sfix}
ACclean = {(i, f(i)) | i ∈ Sclean}
JI (Sbd) and JI (Sfix) are then computed according to Equa-
tion (3). We observe the high value for JI (Sfix) (0.9841),
which means the predictions of the network for fixed images
and clean images are largely similar. Moreover, we see an
improvement of ≈18% over JI (Sbd).
TABLE 5: Effectiveness against poisoned MNIST [7]
Backdoored Images (50) Clean Images(450)
Backdoor detections
#TP #FN #TN #FP
50 (100%) 0 (0%) 450 (100%) 0 (0%)
Backdoor detections after confirmation (cf.Algorithm 2)
50 (100%) 0 (0%) 450 (100%) 0 (0%)
Table 5 and Table 6 measure the effectiveness of NEO
for a poisoned MNIST model [7]. Table 5 show that for this
model NEO identifies the 50 backdoored images before we
test for false positives and there does not exist any false
positives. To be certain, we run Algorithm 2 with ΛT = 0.9
(cf. Algorithm 4). No true positives were ruled out. This
gives us a final backdoor detection rate of 100% and 0% false
positive rates.
TABLE 6: MNIST [7] Attack Mitigation
JI (Sbd) JI (Sfix) %Impr
0 0.890 1 12.28%
1 0.933 1 7.14%
2 0.902 1 10.87%
3 0.848 1 17.95%
4 0.885 1 13.04%
5 0.917 1 9.09%
6 0.833 1 20%
7 0.553 1 80.95%
8 0.850 1 17.65%
9 0.875 1 14.29%
Similar to the previous models, we evaluated the mitiga-
tion capacity of NEO. For each of the class C = 0 . . . 9, we
compute JI (Sbd) and JI (Sfix), as captured in Equation (3).
From Table 6, we observe that the fixed set is exactly in line
with the clean set. Thus, we see improvements of up to ≈
81% in the target class (7) and up to ≈18% in the non target
classes.
Finding: NEO is effective in identifying poisoned
examples. In our evaluations NEO identifies 76%,
86% and 100% of the backdoored examples in the
poisoned USTS, VGG Face and MNIST models with
none to low false positive rates. NEO is also effective
in finding the original prediction of the poisoned
input, as indicated by high JI (Sfix) values.
RQ2: How does NEO compare to other defence
techniques?
To further illustrate the efficacy of NEO, we compare the
attack success rates (after the deployment of the defence) for
the various datasets under comparison to existing defence
techniques for backdoor attacks. We compare NEO defence to
Neural Cleanse [1] and Fine Pruning [11] in Table 7. We show
that despite being a blackbox method, the attack success rate
after deploying the NEO defence is lower than current state
of the art defences.
TABLE 7: NEO Comparison
Dataset Attack Success Rate after deployment of defence
NEO Neural Cleanse [1] Fine Pruning [11]
VGG Face Dataset [12] 1.91% 3.7% -
MNIST [7] 0.0% 0.53% 0.0%
USTS [7] 7.1% - 28.8%
Finding: NEO outperforms current state of the art
defence techniques despite being a blackbox defence
mechanism.
RQ3: How efficient is NEO?
To evaluate this research question, we designed three
datasets where the first backdoor image is found at the
10%ile, 50th%ile and 80%ile, respectively. Each dataset
contains 500 images and 10% of the images are poisoned.
Table 8 reports our findings for all three models. The major
portion of the time is spent in detecting the backdoor. An
increasing trend is seen as the first poisoned input is pushed
later. However in practice, this should not be an issue. An
adversary who has inserted a backdoor will, in our opinion,
be keen to attack the model they have poisoned as soon as
possible. Therefore, the time to detect backdoors is likely to
be lower in practice. The trigger blocker propagation (TBP)
and false positive handling (FP) seem to take roughly the
same amount of time irrespective of the first backdoored
image. In our evaluation, NEO defends against the backdoor
attack with an overhead as low as 4.4ms per image.
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Finding: The major chunk of time spent by NEO is
in detecting the backdoor. Once it has detected the
backdoor, blocking and mitigating the backdoor is
fast.
TABLE 8: NEO Efficiency
Total
Time
Detect
Backdoor TBP FP
USTS Poisoned model [7]
450 clean images - 50 poisoned images
10th%ile
first image 6863.42s 6612.22s 21.33s 58.55s
50th%ile
first image 20284.05s 19868.31s 18.81s 211.64s
80th%ile
first image 33060.38s 32641.00s 20.12s 225.70s
TrojanNN Poisoned model [12]
450 clean images - 50 poisoned images
10th%ile
first image 2726.54s 2017.39s 211.65s 497.50s
50th%ile
first image 6391.26s 5679.05s 209.85s 502.36s
80th%ile
first image 9981.46s 9268.61s 206.86s 505.99s
MNIST Poisoned model [7]
450 clean images - 50 poisoned images
10th%ile
first image 2.20s 2.20s 0.00s 0.00s
50th%ile
first image 91.70s 91.70s 0.00s 0.00s
80th%ile
first image 141.02s 141.00s 0.01s 0.01s
RQ4: Can NEO defend against various backdoor
triggers without significant loss of accuracy?
TABLE 9: Notations used in the Tables for RQ3
PC Prediction Class. The class predicted by the model
CS Clean Set. There are no poisoned examples in this set.
BDS Backdoored set. All the inputs in this set are poisoned.
FS Fixed set. The set produced after running the NEO defence.
TABLE 10: NEO accuracies
USTS accuracies [7]
Yellow
Square Flower Bomb
CS BDS FS BD FS BD FS
92.14% 5.48% 74.22% 1.83% 80.99% 2.93% 76.05%
VGG face accuracies [12]
CS BD FS
74.87% 6.37% 73.61%
In this RQ, we aim to evaluate the efficiency of NEO
to defend against different patterns of backdoor attacks. It
is important to note that we are unable to perform this
evaluation for the TrojanNN [12]. As per our knowledge, the
authors of TrojanNN have only made one of the localised
trigger poisoned model publicly available. As a result of
this, we are unable to fully answer RQ3 for TrojanNN [12].
Thus, for TrojanNN, we only report the accuracy of the fixed
dataset for this attack.
For the poisoned USTS [7] model, we evaluate it on three
backdoored models provided by the authors (cf. Table 10 and
Table 11). These models are trained with different backdoor
triggers, namely the yellow square, flower and bomb. We
poison the entire set of 547 stop sign images (i.e. BDS) and
run our NEO defence on these 547 images, for each backdoor
trigger. To compute the baseline accuracy, we construct a
clean dataset (i.e. CS) of 547 images, where each image is a
clean version of an image in BDS. The accuracy of the model
on this clean dataset is 92.1%. The accuracy of the model
on BDS drops to 5.48%, 1.83% and 2.93% for the yellow
square, flower and bomb triggers, respectively. We run NEO
on the poisoned set of 547 images (i.e. BDS) to produce fixed
datasets (i.e. FS) and the accuracy of the model increases to
74.22%, 80.99% and 76.05% for the yellow square, flower and
bomb poisoned models, respectively. We can observe from
Table 10 and Table 11 that a major portion of the poisoned
dataset is now predicting correctly after the NEO defence and
the accuracy on the fixed set of images is also significantly
close to the baseline.
We evaluate the accuracy of the fixed set (i.e. FS) on the
dataset of 2622 images for the VGG face model poisoned by
TrojanNN (cf. Table 10). We observe an accuracy of 74.87%
on the respective set of clean images (i.e. CS). As seen in
Table 10, the backdoor attack is successful and the accuracy
drops to 6.37% if we poison all of the 2622 images. We run
NEO on the set 2622 poisoned images to produce a fixed set
of images (i.e. FS). The accuracy of the fixed set is 73.61%,
which is very close to the baseline accuracy (i.e. 74.87%).
In the case of the MNIST [7] dataset (cf. Table 11), the
accuracies of the clean set of 500 images is 100% and the
accuracy drops to 15.75% for each of the poisoned models.
This is due to our attack target class being 7. The 63 poisoned
instances of class 7 are still correctly classified as 7. After
running the NEO defence on this dataset, the accuracy of the
fixed set returns to 100% for all the three patterns (i.e. Lateral
L shape, Inverted L shape and 3 dots).
TABLE 11: NEO against various Patterns
USTS poisoned model [7]
Yellow Square Flower Bomb
PC CS BDS FS BDS FS BDS FS
Stop 504 30 406 10 443 16 416
Speedlimit 28 458 79 478 39 473 70
Warning 9 7 10 6 12 6 9
No pred 6 52 52 53 53 52 52
Total 547 547 547 547 547 547 547
MNIST Poisoned model [7]
Lateral L Shape Inverted L Shape 3 dots
PC CS BDS FS BDS FS BDS FS
0 64 0 64 0 64 0 64
1 60 0 60 0 60 0 60
2 51 0 51 0 51 0 51
3 46 0 46 0 46 0 46
4 52 1 52 0 52 0 52
5 36 0 36 0 36 0 36
6 48 0 48 0 48 0 48
7 63 499 63 500 63 500 63
8 40 0 40 0 40 0 40
9 40 0 40 0 40 0 40
Total 500 500 500 500 500 500 500
Finding: The accuracy of fixed set produced by NEO
is only ≈11%, ≈1% and 0% lower than the accuracy
of the clean set for the USTS, VGG Face and MNIST
models, respectively for various patterns.
RQ5: Can NEO recover the trigger patterns?
One of the most attractive properties of NEO is the
fact that it is the first work, to the best of our knowledge,
that can reliably reconstruct the backdoor trigger patterns.
This empowers the user to test their model with potential
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backdoor triggers and ensure the integrity and safety of their
systems. The reconstruction of the backdoor trigger is a result
of the design of Algorithm 2. The set of images in check_set
that pass the ΛT threshold (see Algorithm 2) will contain the
backdoor. The user can use the respective backdoor triggers
to try and poison other images and expose the backdoor.
In other words, NEO helps the user to know the backdoor
trigger, causing the backdoor attack to fail. This is because
one of the key requirements of backdoor attacks is that they
are stealthy.
Figure 7 and Figure 8 capture reconstructed backdoor
triggers by NEO for TrojanNN [12] and BadNets [7], respec-
tively.
Fig. 7: Reconstructed poisoned image from the poisoned Tro-
janNN VGG Face model [12]
(a) Inverted L (b) 3 dots (c) Lateral L
(d) Yellow Square (e) Bomb (f) Flower
Fig. 8: Reconstruction from poisoned MNIST and USTS [7]
models
Finding: NEO effectively reconstructs poisoned exam-
ples so that the user can effectively test their models.
6 RELATED WORK
Testing and Verification of ML models: DeepXplore [16]
employs differential white-box testing to find inputs that
trigger inconsistencies. DeepTest [21] leverages metamorphic
relations to discover error cases in DNNs. A recent work
DeepGauge [13] measures the test quality and formalises a
set of testing criteria for DNNs. SafeCV [26] takes a feature
guided black-box approach to verify the safety of DNNs.
DeepConcolic [18] performs concolic testing to discover
violations of robustness. Aequitas [23] exposes individual
fairness violations for ML models. Wang et al. [24] mutate
the DNN model parameters to find adversarial samples.
ReluVal [25] uses interval arithmetic [14] to estimate a DNN’s
decision boundary by calculating tight bounds on the output
of a model for a given range of inputs. Similarly, Reluplex [9]
verifies properties of interest using SMT solvers. AI2 [5]
employs abstract interpretation to verify the robustness of a
given input against adversarial attacks. AI2 uses zonotopes to
approximate ReLU inputs. The authors do not guarantee pre-
cision, but they do guarantee soundness. Another work [4],
transforms the verification problem into an unconstrained
dual formulation leveraging Lagrange relaxation and uses
gradient-descent to solve the resulting optimisation problem.
All the aforementioned works cannot combat the back-
door attacks in machine learning. This type of attack is
designed to be stealthy and cannot be discovered using
conventional testing methods for Machine Learning. NEO is
specifically developed to combat these kinds of attacks for
Machine Learning models. As a result of the specific design
of NEO, it is able to combat backdoor attacks effectively and
provide a wide array of information to the users. Moreover,
as explained in the preceding paragraph the main goal of all
the works is to explore some specific properties (i.e. fairness,
robustness). In contrast to this, the specific goal of NEO is
identifying the backdoor attack and mitigating such an attack
effectively.
Backdoors in ML: BadNets [7] poisons the training data to
inject a backdoor in an ML model. They choose a pre-defined
target label and a trigger pattern. The patterns are arbitrary
in shape, (e.g. square, flower or bomb.) and the backdoor is
injected into the model by training the network using the
poisoned data.
TrojanNN [12] generates a backdoored model without
interfering with the original training process and without
accessing the training dataset. The approach is able to
inject the backdoors using fewer samples. Additionally, they
improve trigger generation by designing triggers that induce
the maximum response for specific neurons of the DNN and
aims to build a stronger connection between the neurons of
a DNN and the backdoor trigger.
The goal of NEO is to defend against these classes of
attacks in an efficient manner and reconstruct the backdoor
trigger.
Backdoor defences in ML: A recent work [22] involves using
tools from robust statistics to analyse the learned representa-
tion of classes, which they call the spectral signature. The idea
behind this work is that when the training data is poisoned,
there are two significant sub-populations. A small number
of poisoned, mislabelled inputs and a large number of clean,
correctly labelled inputs. Techniques from robust statistics
and singular value decomposition are used to separate the
two populations. The authors assume access to the poisoned
dataset. NEO does not assume any access to a poisoned
dataset and defends against a much stronger attack model.
Another work [11] prunes the neurons which seem to
behave maliciously. It has been shown [1] that such a method
causes a significant loss in performance for some models.
Additionally, fine-pruning doesn’t offer detection capabilities
to identify backdoored images.
NeuralCleanse [1], a completely white-box approach
formulates the problem as an optimisation problem to reverse
engineer the backdoor trigger. Their mitigation technique
involves computationally expensive retraining.
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NEO presents a computationally inexpensive, blackbox
approach to defend against backdoor attacks. NEO is also the
first work, to the best of our knowledge that can also reliably
reconstruct the trigger that users can investigate.
7 THREATS TO VALIDITY
Localised Triggers: NEO assumes the backdoor trigger to be
relatively small and it is not designed to combat targeted
backdoor attacks [3]. Nonetheless, NEO covers a variety of
state-of-the-art backdoor attacks proposed recently [7], [12]
and effectively detects as well as mitigates them.
ΛT threshold: The effectiveness of NEO depends on the
threshold ΛT . If ΛT is too low, we might have a high false
positive rate, but if these parameters are set too high, then we
may not be able to detect backdoors efficiently. Algorithm 4
aims to assist the user to find a range of values which
are optimum for the ΛT threshold, but cannot definitively
determine an optimal value.
Theoretical Soundness Guarantee: NEO offers no theoreti-
cal guarantees that it can identify and mitigate all backdoor
attacks. However, we extensively evaluated our defence and
empirically show that NEO can effectively detect and mitigate
backdoor attacks with minimal loss in baseline accuracy.
8 CONCLUSION
In this paper, we propose NEO, a novel approach to detect
and mitigate backdoor attacks in arbitrary image classifier
models. NEO requires neither the knowledge of model
structure nor does it require access to the poisoned training
set induced by the attacker. The design of NEO further
allows us to reconstruct a backdoor attack – a feature that
existing defences fail to provide in an accurate fashion. Thus,
NEO not only defends against backdoors by switching to
the correct prediction class, but it also breaks the stealthy
nature of the attack by exposing the respective backdoor
trigger. Our evaluation reveals that NEO can successfully
detect and mitigate state-of-the-art backdoor attacks in a
variety of image classifiers and only with minimal loss in
the accuracy. Moreover, despite being a blackbox approach,
NEO is more effective in thwarting backdoor attacks as
compared to the state-of-the-art whitebox techniques. At its
current state, NEO does not defend against targeted backdoor
attacks [3] and backdoor attacks in other domains such as
speech recognition [12]. Further work is needed to include
such defence capabilities in the future.
NEO is a major step towards pushing the state-of-the-art
in verification and validation of ML models, which bring
along several fresh challenges due to their unique data-
driven nature. Thus, to promote research in this area and
reproduce our results, we have made our implementation
and all experimental data publicly available:
https://github.com/sakshiudeshi/Neo
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